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 A matrix method for an inverse conflict analysis is developed. 
 Conditions for required preference relations are derived.   
 Four solution concepts of human behaviour are considered.  
 This method is applicable for both transitive and intransitive preferences. 
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Abstract— Given the final individual stability for each decision maker or an 
equilibrium of interest, a matrix-based method for an inverse analysis is developed in order 
to calculate all of the possible preferences for each decision maker creating the stability 
results based on the Nash, general metarationality, symmetric metarationality, or sequential 
stability definition of possible human interactions in a conflict. The matrix representations 
are furnished for the relative preferences, unilateral movements and improvements, as well 
as joint movements and joint improvements for a conflict having two or more decision 
makers. Theoretical conditions are derived for specifying required preference relationships 
in an inverse graph model. Under each of the four solution concepts, a matrix relationship is 
established to obtain all the available preferences for each decision maker causing the 
specific state to be an equilibrium. To explain how it can be employed in practice, this new 
approach to inverse analysis is applied to the Elsipogtog First Nation fracking dispute which 
took place in the Canadian Province of New Brunswick. 
 
Keywords—Group decision and negotiation, Inverse analysis, Matrix representations, 
Conflict resolution, Graph model 
 
1. Introduction  
Conflicts occur whenever two or more decision makers (DMs) having differences in value 
systems, objectives or preferences, interact in the real world. In fact, each DM in a dispute strives 
to change the course of the conflict and reach a state of interest such as a more preferred state 
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than the status quo. In order to better represent and analyze conflict, many available models to 
conflict resolution have been proposed within a broad field called game theory. The normal and 
extensive forms of the game, which are generally considered to be part of classical game theory, 
were developed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). Classical game theory is considered 
to be quantitative in nature because it uses cardinal preferences often expressed as utility values. 
However, sometimes it is difficult for a DM to determine how much he prefers one state to 
another. Thus, Howard (1971) designed a fresh approach called metagame analysis which only 
assumes the availability of relative preference information in which a given DM either prefers 
one state over another or they are equally preferred. A methodology called conflict analysis put 
forward by Fraser and Hipel (1979; 1984) was an enhancement and expansion of metagame 
analysis. The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR), which is more comprehensive than 
existing methodologies, was proposed by Kilgour, Hipel, and Fang (1987) and Fang, Hipel, and 
Kilgour (1993). The above three methodologies are regarded as qualitative techniques because 
only relative preference information between any two states is assumed. Because of the foregoing 
and other reasons, GMCR is widely employed by practitioners and researchers for investigating 
real world conflict in a highly flexible yet simple way (Madani, 2013). 
According to the GMCR procedure, the elements used in this approach can be classified into 
three main parts which are input, analysis, and output (Fang, Hipel, Kilgour, & Peng, 2003; 
Kinsara, Petersons, Hipel, & Kilgour, 2015b). The primary items in the input part are the DMs, 
feasible states in the dispute and DMs’ relative preferences over the states. Either an individual or 
a group, such as a company, can be a DM. A DM can control one or more options, each of which 
can be selected or not by the DM who controls it. A feasible state is formed as a specific selection 
of options by the DMs. The analysis part is employed to determine whether a given state is stable 
for a specified DM or not. The state is said to be stable for a DM if the DM cannot reach a more 
preferred state in the midst of moves and counter movements by other DMs. An equilibrium of a 
graph model is a state that is individually stable for all DMs under the same stability definition. A 
series of stability definitions have been proposed including Nash stability (Nash, 1950, 1951), 
general metarationality (GMR) (Howard, 1971), symmetric metarationality (SMR) (Howard, 
1971), and sequential stability (SEQ) (Fraser & Hipel, 1979, 1984). 
The DMs in conflicts may have different purposes when investigating a dispute with 
different known information. In most situations, one wishes to ascertain the output of an ongoing 
or a historical dispute by using the analysis engine to calculate various types of individual 
stability and equilibria after identifying the input part. This is called the forward perspective as 














known while a question mark (?) indicates an item to determine. Most of the extensions to enrich 
the theory and applicability of GMCR have been developed under the domain of the forward 
perspective (Basher, Kilgour, & Hipel, 2012; Bristow, Fang, & Hipel, 2014; He, Kilgour, & Hipel, 
2017; Xu, Hipel, & Kilgour, 2009; Xu, Kilgour, Hipel, & Kemkes, 2010). In some cases, the 
analyst may wish to determine the type of behavior needed to reach a state of interest. This is 
called the behavioral problem which is depicted as the middle diagram in Fig. 1 (Kinsara et al., 
2015b) and for which a mathematical solution was recently provided (Wang, Hipel, Fang, Xu, & 
Kilgour, 2018).  
In some conflict situations, one wishes to know the preferences required by DMs in order to 
reach an attractive resolution for all parties. In third party intervention, for example, a third party 
is invited to a negotiation in order to assist the disputants to reach a win/win resolution (see, for 
instance, Hipel, Sakamoto, and Hagihara (2015)). The third party facilitators may wish to 
ascertain which preferences are required by the parties in order to reach such an attractive 
outcome. In order to analyze the resolution of such conflicts in which the preferences for each 
DM are unknown or partially unknown, the inverse analysis in a graph model is proposed as 
displayed at the bottom of Fig. 1. As introduced by Kinsara, Kilgour, and Hipel (2015a), the main 
feature of the inverse analysis is that the preference information must be determined.  
In summary, GMCR can be categorized into three perspectives based on the different given 
information and goals. As can be appreciated, each perspective solves a different kind of conflict 
problem. The differences among these three perspectives in a graph model are encapsulated as 
follows: 
a) The forward perspective determines the possible equilibria by carrying out the stability 
analysis based on the preferences of each DM contained in the input. 
b) The behavioral perspective ascertains the types of behavior which can produce the outcome 
of that dispute with the known preferences. 
c) The inverse perspective determines the unknown or partially unknown preference 
relationships for each DM which are required to make a state of interest be an equilibrium 
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Fig. 1. Three perspectives of carrying out a GMCR study (based on Fig. 1 in the paper by Kinsara 
et al. (2015b)). 
 
Inverse analysis can provide all of the possible preferences for the DMs to reach a desired 
resolution. For instance, a third party in a conflict (Hipel et al., 2015), who may be a mediator or 
analyst, can use the results of the inverse approach to determine how to persuade each DM to 
select the options resulting in the desired equilibrium according to the needed preferences. In 
other words, a third-party intervenor can employ inverse analysis to design his mediation strategy 
based on the required preference relationships to reach a more desired outcome. On the other 
hand, a particular DM involved in the dispute can take advantage of inverse analysis to change his 
own preferences and attempt to influence a competitor such that an equilibrium of interest can be 
reached (Kinsara et al., 2015a). In fact, within engineering and science, inverse analysis is 
referred to as inverse engineering and constitutes a crucial field of study when addressing 
physical systems problems (Gladwell, 2005). The topic of this paper is inverse engineering within 
societal systems in the presence of conflict. 
In the field of conflict resolution, techniques for tackling the inverse problem possess some 
drawbacks. More specifically, the inverse model studied by Kinsara et al. (2015a) assumes the 
employment of ordinal preferences which mean the preferences are transitive and hence 














Kinsara et al. (2015a) investigated the inverse problem using the logical representation of GMCR 
and an enumeration method which encounters the issue of computational complexity. In order to 
address the aforementioned two shortcomings, the preferences of each DM are defined by using 
pairwise comparisons of every pair of states in conflict as given later in this paper in Definition 1, 
which means the findings in this paper are valid for both transitive and intransitive preferences. 
Preference matrices are defined later in Definition 2 to mathematically represent the binary 
relation between each two states. Preference matrices are employed to derive the mathematical 
representations of an inverse problem in a graph model having two or more DMs in this research. 
The preferences for each DM required to make a state of interest be an equilibrium with the given 
solution concept can be obtained using the inequalities provided in Section 4. As shown in 
Section 5.4, the computational complexity of the inverse analysis in a graph model can be 
enormously reduced by using the matrix representations of the inverse GMCR approach proposed 
in this paper instead of the enumeration method given by Kinsara et al. (2015a). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, two potential general 
applications of this inverse engineering approach to GMCR are described. Within Section 3, 
matrix representations of preferences, unilateral movements and improvements, and joint 
movements and improvements are given. Matrix formulations of the inverse analyses for Nash 
stability, GMR, SMR and SEQ are presented and proven in Section 4. Section 5 consists of a case 
study of a controversial fracking dispute among the Elsipogtog First Nation, New Brunswick 
Provincial Government and Southwestern Energy (SWN) Resources in Eastern Canada, which is 
used to demonstrate how the proposed matrix representations of the inverse problem can be 
conveniently employed in practice. Finally, some conclusions and ideas for future work are 
presented in Section 6. 
 
2. Application approaches 
In some real life conflicts, the output and part of the input preference information to a graph 
model are known, but the required preferences of one or more DMs to generate the output are 
unknown, as portrayed at the bottom of Fig. 1. More specifically, an analyst may wish to 
ascertain the possible preferences of DMs which satisfy the given final stability results in a 
historical conflict. For instance, in the past two DMs have reached an equilibrium in a conflict 
after tough negotiations. However, little information is provided about their preferences. A 
historian could employ the inverse method provided in this paper to determine the DMs’ 
preferences. Moreover, he could also utilize the inverse methodology to ascertain the preferences 














why a Pareto superior outcome did not occur. In addition, for an ongoing dispute, the DMs may 
want to determine what preferences can help them reach a specified preferred equilibrium or an 
equilibrium of interest. For example, a facilitator or third party (Hipel et al., 2015) may wish to 
influence the preferences of one or more participants involved in a conflict such that a better or 
win/win resolution can be achieved. These two potential problems are portrayed in Fig. 2. 
As just mentioned, two major ways in which the inverse GMCR approach can be used for 
addressing conflict are: 
a) For a historical conflict, ascertain all the possible preferences of each DM that produced the 
known equilibrium which is the final result of the dispute; 
b) For an ongoing conflict, determine each possible preference relationship of the DMs required 
to reach a particular desirable resolution or state of interest if it is possible to do so. 
These two situations that could occur in an inverse analysis study are depicted as the upper and 
lower diagrams in Fig. 2, respectively. In Fig. 2, a check sign (√) means the associated 
information is known while a question mark (?) indicates an item to calculate. 
 
Two Potential Applications of Inverse Analysis t ti l li ti  f I r  l i
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Fig. 2. Two potential applications of inverse problems. 
 
 
As depicted in Fig. 2, the matrix representations for determining the preferences in an 
inverse GMCR problem can be used in both historical and ongoing conflicts. In a real conflict, 
partial preference relations of each DM may be given. With the known part of the preferences, the 
remaining preferences required to reach the final equilibrium in a historical conflict or produce an 
equilibrium of interest can be calculated using the matrix representations proposed in Section 4. 
In some particular situations, it is not possible to reach a state of interest under the known 
preferences. In addition, this approach can also be used when the preferences of each DM are 















3. Modeling of a graph model with matrix representations 
GMCR was originally formulated using what is called the “logical” form since solution 
concepts defining possible human behavior are explained in terms of moves and counter moves. 
For instance, if all possible unilateral improvements from a given state by a particular DM can be 
blocked by counter moves by other DMs, the DM is better off not to move and the state under 
consideration is deemed to be stable. Xu et al. (2009, 2010) provided a clever matrix or algebraic 
formulation of GMCR including the range of solution concepts describing possible human 
behavior under conflict. Because the matrix form is especially well suited for performing stability 
calculations within a decision support system and for theoretically expanding the scope of GMCR, 
this formulation is employed in this paper for defining inverse GMCR. 
To analyze the needed preferences for DMs causing a state of interest to be an equilibrium, 
the basic concepts for constructing a graph model of the conflict using matrix representations are 
given in this section. In particular, the matrices used to keep track of preferences, unilateral 
moves and unilateral improvements for each DM in a conflict model are defined. The definitions 
of group movements and the joint movement and improvement matrices for the group in a dispute 
are furnished in this section. 
Definition 1 (Fang et al., 1993; Kilgour et al., 1987) (Graph Model): The four main 
components required to develop a graph model of a conflict with two or more DMs are provided 
as follows: 
1) a finite set of the DMs represented by N  where 2N n   (“  ” denotes the 
cardinality of a set); 
2) the set of all the feasible states is denoted as  1, 2, ,S m  in which m  is the 
number of feasible states;  
3) for each DM i N , let 
iA S S   be a set of arcs containing all the unilateral 
movements controlled by DM i  in one step; 
4) for each DM i N , the simple preference of DM i  which contains a pair of relations 
 , ~i i  on S , where ( , )is q s S q S   indicates that DM i  strictly prefers state 
s  to q  while ~is q  implies DM i  equally prefers s  and q . 
Three properties connected to the above preference relations of each DM i N  are given 
as follows: 
1) ~ i  is reflexive and symmetric (i.e., , , ~is q S s s  , and if ~is q  , then ~iq s ); 
2) 
i
 is asymmetric (i.e., 














3)  , ~i i  is strongly complete which implies for any ,s q S , only one of the 
following preference relations of DM i  can hold: ~is q , is q  or iq s . 
Because of the third property, it is assumed any given two states can be compared using strict or 
equal preference. Roy (1996, Section 7.1.1.2) uses the terminology of indifference by a DM 
between two states when these two states are equally preferred. In practice, especially when the 
conflict has existed for a while, preferences are usually transitive whereby the states can be 
ranked from most to least preferred where ties are allowed. An example of transitivity among 
three states, , , ands q p S , for DM i  is 
is q , iq p , and is p . However, as discussed 
in the introduction, the preferences of some DMs may be intransitive in some situations, 
especially when the conflict is in its early stages. For instance, the preference relations of DM i  
for the three given states , ands q p  are 
is q , iq p , and or ~i ip s p s . The findings 
in this research can handle both transitive and intransitive preferences. 











be the four m m  preference matrices for DM i  whose entry ( , )s q  for which ,s q S  is 
















































For the above definition, it is assumed that
=( , ) ( , ) =0i iP s s P s s
  ， . 
Definition 3 (Xu et al., 2009) (Unilateral Movements and Improvements of a focal DM): In 
a graph model, let 
iJ  and iJ

 denote two m m  0-1 matrices representing the unilateral 
moves and unilateral improvements of DM i  respectively, as follows:  





































 ( ) : if ( , ) 1 ,i iR s q J s q   
and the set of unilateral improvements of DM i from s , represented by ( )iR s

, is given as  
 ( ) : if ( , ) 1 .i iR s q J s q    
For Definition 3, it is assumed that ( , ) 0iJ s s  . 
Assume that H N  is any subset of the DMs, and let ( )HR s  and ( )HR s

 represent the set 
of all states that can be formed from any sequence of unilateral moves and unilateral 
improvements, by some or all of the DMs in H , beginning at state s , respectively. In the 
definitions, one DM can move more than once, but not twice consecutively. If 
1 ( )Hs R s , let 
1( )Hs s  stand for the set of all last DMs in legal sequences from s  to 1s . Similarly, if
1 ( )Hs R s
 , 1( )Hs s
  is used to denote the set of all last DMs in legal sequences of unilateral 
improvements from s to
1s . 
Definition 4 (Fang et al., 1993) (Movements and Improvements by DMs in H ): Let s S  
and H N , H  . A unilateral move by H  is a member of ( )HR s S  and a unilateral 
improvement by H  is a member of ( )HR s S
  , defined inductively by: 
Definition for ( )HR s :  
1) if j H  and 1 ( )js R s , then 1 ( )Hs R s  and 1( )Hsj s ,  
2) if 
1 ( )Hs R s , j H , and 2 1( )js R s , then 
a) if 1( ) 1Hs s   and 1( )Hsj s , then 2 ( )Hs R s  and 2( )Hsj s .  
b) if 1( ) 1Hs s  , then 2 ( )Hs R s  and 2( )Hsj s . 
Definition for ( )HR s
 : 
1) if j H  and 1 ( )js R s
 , then 
1 ( )Hs R s
  and 1( )Hsj s
 ,  
2) if 
1 ( )Hs R s
 , j H , and 2 1( )js R s
 , then 
a) if 1( ) 1Hs s
   and 
1( )Hsj s
 , then 2 ( )Hs R s
  and 2( )Hsj s
 , 
b) if 1( ) 1Hs s
  , then 2 ( )Hs R s
  and 2( )Hsj s
 . 
Definition 5 (Xu et al., 2009) (Joint Movement and Joint Improvement Matrices): In a graph 
model, let 
HM  and HM
  be two m m  matrices called the joint movement matrix and joint 






































Note that when  H i , H iM J  and H iM J
  . 
Definition 6 (Sign Function): Given an m m  matrix M . Let ( )sign M  denote the 
m m  matrix with ( , )s q  entry as follows: 
1, ( , ) 0
[ ( , )] 0, ( , ) 0
1, ( , ) 0.
M s q








4. Inverse analysis using matrix representations 
In the inverse problematique of a graph model, one may wish to study the preferences of the 
DMs given the known behavior of the DMs and a specified equilibrium. The DMs in the conflict 
may want to ascertain what preferences are needed to cause a state of interest to be stable 
according to the specified behavior. Four definitions of stabilities consisting of Nash stability 
(Nash, 1950, 1951), general metarationality (GMR) (Howard, 1971), symmetric metarationality 
(SMR) (Howard, 1971), and sequential stability (SEQ) (Fraser & Hipel, 1979, 1984) are given in 
this section. According to the definitions, four theorems and their proofs corresponding to the four 
types of solution concepts are given to analyze the inverse problems using matrix representations 
in a graph model of the conflict. In this section, the four equivalent matrix definitions for stability 
were originally provided by Xu et al. (2009). 
As proved by Fang, Hipel, and Kilgour (1989) and Fang et al. (1993), the theoretical 
relationships among the aforementioned four solution concepts are as portrayed in Fig. 3. The 
relationships in the Venn diagram are valid for both individual stability and equilibria according 
to the solution concepts. Notice, for example, in Fig. 3 that if a state is Nash stable then it is also 
GMR, SMR and SEQ. Additionally, the stability findings for each of Nash, SMR and SEQ are 
always a subset of GMR results. These special theoretical relationships are used when proving 
























Fig. 3.  Relationships among solution concepts for both individual stability and 
equilibria (based on Fang et al. (1989, 1993)). 
 
In the following definitions and theorems, recall that ( 2)N n n   and m  denote the 
numbers of DMs and feasible states, respectively. Let E  be an m m  matrix and e  denote an 
m-dimensional column vector in both of which each entry is 1. Let 
se  be an m-dimensional 
column vector where the ths  entry is 1 and all other entries are 0. Given two m g  matrices 
C  and Y , define the Hadamard product (Davis, 1962) Q C Y  as the m g  matrix with 
( , )s q  entry ( , ) ( , ) ( , )Q s q C s q Y s q  . Let  N i  denote the set of the other DMs except DM 
i . 
A definition for the relationships between matrices and a key theorem are given before the 
inverse analysis to ascertain what kind of preferences under conflict, referred to as the four 
solution concepts, are in consonance with known stabilities or states of interest to the DMs. 
Definition 7 (Matrix Relations): Let 
1 2andL L  be two 1m  matrices.  
1) Definition for the matrix relation denoted using  : The relation 
1 2L L  means that 
each entry 
1( ,1) ( 1, 2, , )L l l m  in matrix 1L  is either larger or equal to the specified entry 
2 ( ,1) ( 1, 2, , )L l l m  in matrix 2L .  
2) Definition for the matrix relation which uses  : The relation 1L  2L  denotes that 
there is at least one entry 
1( ,1)L l  in matrix 1L  which is smaller than the specified entry 2 ( ,1)L l  
in matrix 
2L . 














( ,1)L l  is a non-negative integer. Define the following function f  by  
( ( )).Tf K e sign L    (T denotes matrix and vector transpose.)          (1) 
Then, 0f   iff L K . 
Proof: 1) If 0f  , 
1
( ,1) (1 ( ( ,1))) 0
m
l
f K l sign L l

    . Since K  is a 0-1 1m  matrix, 
( ,1)K l  is equal to either 1 or 0.  
When ( ,1) 1K l  , ( ( ,1))sign L l  must be equal to 1 which means ( ,1) 1L l  . Then, 
( ,1) ( ,1)L l K l ; 
When ( ,1) 0K l  , ( ( ,1))sign L l  can be equal to either 0 or 1 which means ( ,1)L l  could be 
any non-negative integer according to the definiton of L . Then, ( ,1) ( ,1)L l K l . 
Hence, if 0f   then L K . 
2) If L K , 
1
( ,1) (1 ( ( ,1)))
m
l
f K l sign L l

   . 
When ( ,1) 1K l  , ( ,1) ( ,1) 1L l K l  . Then, ( ( ,1)) 1sign L l   which indicates 0f  . 
When ( ,1) 0K l  , it is obvious that 0f  . 
Hence, if L K , then 0f  .□ 
Definition 8 (Matrix Definition for Nash Stability): State s S  is Nash stable for DM i  
iff 0
T
s ie J e
   . 
Theorem 2 (Inverse Analysis for Nash Stability): If state s S  is Nash stable for DM 
i N , the preferences of DM i  satisfy the following conditions:  
(( ) ) 0.T Ts i i se J P e
                             (2) 




( , ) ( , ) 0
m
T
s i i i
s
e J e J s s P s s 

      iff 1 1 1( , ) ( , ) 0,i iJ s s P s s s S









i i i i s
s
J s s P s s e J P e 

      . Equation (2) indicates that for any 
1 ( )is R s , the preference relation of DM i  between states 1s  and s  must be 1( , ) 0iP s s
  .□ 




,[ ( ( ) )].GMR Ti i iN iM J E sign M P
  

                        (3) 
State s S  is GMR for DM i  iff , 0( )
GMR














Theorem 3 (Matrix Inequality for Inverse GMR): State s S  is GMR for DM i N iff 
the preferences of DM i  satisfy the following conditions:  
 
,( ( ) ) ( ) (( ) ).T T Ti s i s i sN iM P e J e P e
  

                  (4) 
Proof: Based on Definition 2, 
,
i iP E I P
      where I  is the identity matrix. Since state 
s S  is GMR for DM i , then according to Definition 9, 
 
,( , ) [( ) (( ) ) ] [ ( (( ) ))] 0.GMR T T T Ti i s i s i sN iM s s J e P e e sign M P e
  

          (5) 
In Equation (5), ( ) (( ) )
T T
i s i sJ e P e
   is a 0-1 1m  matrix and  
,( ( ) )Ti sN iM P e
 

   is 
an 1m  matrix whose entries are all non-negative integers. According to Theorem 1, 
( , ) 0GMRiM s s   which implies state s  is GMR for DM i  iff 
 
,( ( ) ) ( ) (( ) )T T Ti s i s i sN iM P e J e P e
  

     .□ 




1 2 2 1 1 1
1
( , ) ( ( , )) ( , ) ( , ) 0, .
m
i i iN i
s
M s s P s s J s s P s s s S  


              (6) 
The above proof used mathematical logic. Actually, Theorem 3 can also be explained by the 
theoretical relationships between Nash stability and GMR. Hence, if a state is stable according to 






Fig. 4. Theoretical relationships between Nash stability and GMR (based on Fang et al. 
(1989, 1993)). 
 
In Inequality (6), 1 1 1( , ) ( , ) ( , )i i iJ s s P s s J s s
   . Then, state s  is GMR, 
1) If 1 1, ( , ) 0is S J s s
   , which means state s  is not only GMR stable but also 
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2) If 1 1, ( , ) 1is S J s s
   , which means state s  is not Nash stable but possesses 










M s s P s s 


   based on Inequality (6) which implies that for any 
1 ( )is R s






  with 
,
2( , ) 1iP s s
   . 
As indicated in the above situations within 1) and 2), Inequality (6) contains all the 
conditions of the preference relations for state s  to be GMR for DM i . 
Definition 10 (Matrix Definition for SMR): Let 
SMR
iM  denote an m m  matrix as 
follows:  
 
[ ( )],SMRi i N iM J E sign M W


                         (7) 
where 
,( ) [ ( ( ) )].T Ti i iW P E sign J P
                          (8) 
State s S  is SMR for DM i  iff , 0( )
SMR
iM s s  . 
Theorem 4 (Inverse Analysis for SMR): State s S  is SMR for DM i N  iff the 
preferences of DM i  satisfy the following conditions: 
 
( ) (( ) ).T Ts i s i sN iM W e J e P e


                         (9) 
Proof: Since state s S  is SMR for DM i , then according to Definition 10,  
 
[( ) (( ) )] [ ( )( , ) ] 0.T T Ti s i s sN i
SMR
i J e P e e sig eM n M Ws s


                (10) 
In Equation (10), ( ) (( ) )
T T
i s i sJ e P e
   is a 0-1 1m  matrix and   sN iM W e    is an 
1m  matrix whose entries are all non-negative integers. According to Theorem 1, 
( , ) 0SMRiM s s   which implies state s  is SMR for DM i  iff 
 
( ) (( ) )T Ts i s i sN iM W e J e P e


     .□ 
As noted in Inequality (6), Inequality (4) which is represented by matrix in Theorem 3 can 
be calculated while the outcome of Inequality (4) should be a set of inequalities whose number is 
less than m . However, in Theorem 4, a sign function is contained in Inequality (9). Therefore, 
one can only use the enumeration to solve the inequality with the sign function. A theorem is 
provided to handle this problem as follows: 
Theorem 5: Let K  and U  denote two 0-1 1m  matrices. Let L  be an 1m  matrix 














( ) ( ) .T T TK U L K U L                           (11) 
Proof: On the left side of Equation (11), 
1




K U L K l U l L l

     where 
( ,1)K l , ( ,1)U l  and ( ,1)L l  are the entries in the three 1m  matrices, respectively. On the right 
side of Equation (11), 
1




K U L K l U l L l

     which is equal to the left side. 
□ 
Theorem 6 (Matrix Inequality for Inverse SMR): Inequality (9), that is the matrix condition 
of preference relations for DM i  to generate his individual SMR stability of state s , is 
equivalent to Formula (12) which can be calculated as: 




( ) (( ) ) ( , ) ( , ) 1 ,
.
T T T
s i s i iN i








Proof: From Inequality (9), the following inequality can be obtained, 
 
,[ (( ) ) ( ( ( ) ))] ( ) (( ) ).T T T Ti s i i s i s i sN iM P e e sign J P e J e P e
   

           (13) 
Inequality (13) means for each 1s S ,  
 1 1
,[ (( ) ) ( ( ( ) ))] ( ) (( ) ).T T T Ts i s i i s s i s i sN ie M P e e sign J P e e J e P e
   

              (14) 
Since 
1 1 1
( ) (( ) ) ( , ) ( , )T Ts i s i s i ie J e P e J s s P s s
      , then 
1
( ) (( ) )T Ts i s i se J e P e
    must be 
equal to either 1 or 0.  
1) If 1 1( , ) ( , ) 0i iJ s s P s s
  , it is obvious that Inequality (13) is true. 
2) If 1 1( , ) ( , ) 1i iJ s s P s s
  , then  
 1
,
1[ (( ) ) ( ( ( ) ))] 1 .
T T
s i s i i sN i
e M P e e sign J P e s S  

                 (15) 
Using Theorem 6 provided above, Inequality (15) can be converted to the following inequality: 
 1
,
1( ) [ (( ) ) ] ( ( ( ) )) 1 .
T T T
s i s i i sN i
e M P e e sign J P e s S  

                (16) 
The left part of Inequality (16) is equal to a non-negative integer. Therefore, Inequality (16) 
is equivalent to the following function: 
 1
,
1( ) [ (( ) ) ] ( ( ( ) )) 0 .
T T T
s i s i i sN i
e M P e e sign J P e s S  

               (17) 
Consequently, the conditions of preference relations satisfying Inequality (17) can be 
















1( ) [ (( ) ) ] ( ( ( ) )) 0 .
T T T
s i s i i sN i
e M P e e sign J P e s S  

               (18) 




1( ) ( ) (( ) ) .
T T T
i i s s i sN i
J P e e M P e s S  

                  (19) 
Therefore, Inequality (15) could be presented by Inequality (20): 




1( ) (( ) ) ,
T T
s i sN i
e M P e s S 

               (20) 
Combining the situations 1) and 2), Inequality (12) is equivalent to Inequality (9).□ 




2 3 3 1 2 2 1
1
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ( , )) ,
m
i i iN i
s
J s s P s s M s s P s s s S  


               (21) 
where 1 1( , ) ( , ) 1i iJ s s P s s
  . 
In Inequality (21),  
,
1 2 2( , ) ( ( , ))iN iM s s P s s
 









J s s P s s

   if Inequality (21) is true for state 2s S . 
Similar to the inverse problem for GMR, the above proof used mathematical logic. Actually, 
Theorem 6 can also be explained by the theoretical relationships between Nash stability and SMR 





Fig. 5. Theoretical relationships between Nash stability and SMR (based on Fang et al. 
(1989, 1993)). 
 
In Inequality (12), 1 1 1( , ) ( , ) ( , )i i iJ s s P s s J s s
   . Hence, state s  is SMR, 
1) If 1 1, ( , ) 0is S J s s
   , which means that state s  is not only SMR stable but also 
Nash stable for DM i  corresponding to the white ellipse in Fig. 5, then 
 


















2) If 1 1, ( , ) 1is S J s s
   , which means state s  is not Nash stable but SMR stable for 
DM i  corresponding to the dashed area in Fig. 5, then as proven in situation 2) of 
Theorem 6, Inequality (21) is equivalent to the statement that, 1 ( )is R s
  , there exists 
at least one 
2 { } 1( )N is R s  with 2( , ) 0iP s s
   and 3( , ) 0iP s s
   for all 3 2( )is R s . 
As mentioned in the above situations 1) and 2) of Theorem 6, Inequality (12) contains all of the 
conditions of the preference relations for state s  to be SMR for DM i . 




,[ ( ( ) )].
N i
SEQ T
i i iM J E sign M P
                         (22) 
State s S  is SEQ for DM i  iff , 0( )
SEQ
iM s s  . 
Theorem 7 (Matrix Inequality for Inverse SEQ): State s S  is SEQ for DM i N  iff the 
preferences of DM i  satisfy the following conditions:  
 
,(( ) ) ( ) (( ) ).
N i
T T T
i s i s i sM P e J e P e
                        (23) 
Proof: Since state s S  is SEQ for DM i , then according to Definition 11, 
 
,( , ) [( ) (( ) ) ] [ ( (( ) ))] 0
N i
SEQ T T T T
i i s i s i sM s s J e P e e sign M P e
             (24) 
In Equation (24), ( ) (( ) )
T T
i s i sJ e P e





i sM P e
     is 
an 1m  matrix whose entries are all non-negative integers. According to Theorem 1, 
( , ) 0SEQiM s s   which implies state s  is SEQ for DM i  iff 
 
,(( ) ) ( ) (( ) )
N i
T T T
i s i s i sM P e J e P e
        .□ 
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M s s P s s J s s P s s s S

   

                 (25) 
The analysis of preference relationships in an inverse problem for SEQ is a refinement based 
on the inverse analysis of GMR. Actually, Theorem 7 can also be explained by the theoretical 
relationships between Nash stability and SEQ since if a state is stable according to Nash stability 

















Fig. 6. Theoretical relationships between Nash stability and SEQ (based on Fang et al. (1989, 
1993)). 
 
In Inequality (25), 1 1 1( , ) ( , ) ( , )i i iJ s s P s s J s s
   . Then, state s  is SEQ, 
1) If 1 1, ( , ) 0is S J s s
   , which means state s  is not only SEQ stable but also Nash 






















2) If 1 1, ( , ) 1is S J s s
   , which means state s  is not Nash stable but SEQ stable for DM 















   
based on Inequality (25) which implies for any 1 ( )is R s






  with 2( , ) 0iP s s
  . 
As mentioned in the above situations 1) and 2), Inequality (25) can contain all the conditions of 
the preference relationships for state s  to be SEQ for DM i . 
According to Theorems 2, 3, 6, and 7, an analyst can easily obtain the set of all possible 
preference relations for any type of solution concept while the enumeration method given by 
Kinsara et al. (2015a) needs to test the preference relations one-by-one. It means this novel 
inverse GMCR approach is much more efficient. 
 
5. Application of inverse analysis to the Elsipogtog First Nation fracking dispute 
A New Brunswick fracking dispute in Canada between the provincial Government of 
Premier Alward and Elsipogtog First Nation is employed to illustrate how the proposed approach 
for determining the required preferences of each DM for a given state of interest to be an 
equilibrium works in practice. Because this conflict was previously formulated and analyzed by 
O’Brien and Hipel (2016), the possible equilibria to this dispute under the preferences provided in 














are not known, the new matrix representations for preference analysis presented in Section 4 in 
this paper are used to ascertain the preferences of each DM to make a state of interest be an 
equilibrium. Under the assumption that the conflict is current or ongoing, one state of interest for 
a DM called New Brunswick Provincial Government is selected to illustrate how the algorithms 
provided in Section 4 for calculating the required preferences of DMs can be used to reach an 
equilibrium of interest.  
In Section 5.1, the background of this dispute is introduced and the conflict is modeled using 
option form. The matrix form of this model is then presented in Section 5.2 followed by the 
preference analysis in Section 5.3. The novel approach for solving the inverse problem of GMCR 
is compared with the technique developed by Kinsara et al. (2015a) in Section 5.4. As shown in 
Section 5.3, each DM can obtain an inequality containing all of the possible preference 
relationships to cause the specific state to become an equilibrium under a particular solution 
concept by using the proposed inverse GMCR approach. This inequality provides a lower 
computational complexity for determining the preference relationships than the enumeration 
method as indicated in Table 3. 
One should keep in mind that the four solution concepts and connected theorems for 
establishing the conditions for the inverse problem depend upon pairwise preference information 
stored in matrices. Because preference comparisons occur only between two states, both transitive 
and intransitive preference situations can be taken into account and preference cycles cannot 
arise.  
 
5.1. Background and the option form of the dispute 
The Elsipogtog First Nation fracking dispute, which occurred in June of 2013, was first 
formally modeled and analyzed by O’Brien and Hipel (2016). The Frederick Brook shale deposit 
where the dispute took place is located in the southern part of the Province of New Brunswick in 
Canada. The New Brunswick Provincial Government (NBPG) preferred to develop the shale gas 
resource because of the benefits for its economy. Many residents were worried about potential 
environmental pollution when allowing shale gas exploration and extraction by fracking. The 
Elsipogtog First Nation was the most noteworthy party which opposed the shale gas development 
in New Brunswick. An American company called Southwestern Energy (SWN) Resources was 
contracted by NBPG to carry out the seismic testing for the shale gas exploration. The New 
Brunswickers who attempted to prevent the NBPG and SWN Resources from developing the 
shale gas resource blocked a key road on September 30
th
, 2013. Assuming that the conflict is 














knows nothing about the preferences of each DM. Each DM’s preferences required for the state 
of interest to be an equilibrium is important to NBPG. With the required preferences of DMs, a 
specific strategy for the negotiation can be formulated to bring about a desirable result. The 
matrix representations used in preference analysis presented in Section 4 is employed to obtain 
the required preferences of DMs for the equilibrium of interest to occur. The DMs and options for 
the New Brunswick fracking dispute are summarized as follows. 
1) The Elsipogtog First Nation (called EFN) can continue to protest or not protest by 
allowing the seismic testing to resume unhindered. 
2) The New Brunswick Provincial Government (NBPG) cannot allow the shale gas 
exploration or fracking on Elsipogtog First Nation traditional land, or give a percentage of 
fracking royalties to the Elsipogtog First Nation. 
3) The Southwestern Energy (SWN) Resources can pursue legal action or not.  
As constructed by O’Brien and Hipel (2016), the DMs and their options as well as the twelve 
feasible states in the conflict are listed in Table 1. As can be seen, each of the three DMs is listed 
in the left column of this table followed by the option or options it controls. Each column of Ys 
and Ns in this table represents a specific feasible state. A “Y” opposite an option implies “yes” 
the option is chosen while an “N” means “no” the option is not taken by the DM. A state number 
is given below each column for convenience of reference. In Table 1, for example, state 
1s  
represents the situation in which Elsipogtog First Nation does not protest and allows the seismic 
testing to resume unhindered (as indicated by the “N” opposite option 1). NBGP selects to neither 
allow the fracking to take place on Elsipogtog First Nation traditional land nor to give a 
percentage of fracking royalties. SWN Resources is not taking legal action. 
 
 
Table 1 Feasible states in the Elsipogtog First Nation fracking dispute. 
DMs and Options Feasible States 
1. Elsipogtog First Nation 
(1) Protest N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y 
2. New Brunswick Provincial Government 
(2) No fracking N N Y Y N N N N Y Y N N 
(3) Royalties N N N N Y Y N N N N Y Y 
3. SWN Resources 
(4) Legal action N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State Number s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 
 
 














example, EFN can on its own cause the conflict to go from state 
1s  to 2s  by changing its option 
selection from “N” to “Y”. This is a unilateral move because the other two DMs keep the same 
option selections. The arcs connecting states given as vertices in Fig. 7 graphically display all of 
the unilateral moves of each DM in this fracking dispute. 
In Fig. 7, a two-directional arc means that the movement between two states is reversible. In 
this conflict, all the movements are reversible. For example, as shown in Fig. 7(a), the move by 
Elsipogtog First Nation from 
1s  to 2s  is reversible, since the arrows or the arc point in opposite 
directions. 
 

































Fig. 7. State transition graphs for the DMs in the Elsipogtog First Nation fracking dispute. 
 
 
5.2. Matrix form of the graph model 
According to the definitions presented in Section 3, the matrix form of the graph model for 
this conflict is provided for each DM in this subsection. In this dispute, the preferences of each 
DM are assumed to be unknown. The matrices for unilateral movements and joint movements are 
listed here. As indicated in Table 1, the DMs Elsipogtog First Nation, New Brunswick Provincial 
Government and SWN Resources are labeled using the numbers 1 to 3, respectively. The 
italicized “ N ” represents the set containing these DMs. 
The unilateral movement matrix J1 and joint movement matrix MN-{1} for Elsipogtog First 















0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
=
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1






















1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
=
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0






















Notice, for example, that 
1(1, 2) 1J   means that Elsipogtog First Nation can move from 1s  to 2s  
in one step (see Fig. 7(a)), as mentioned before. 
The unilateral movement matrix 
2J  and joint movement matrix  2NM   for NBPG 
following Definitions 3 and 5 and Fig. 7 are:  
2
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
=
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0






















1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
=
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1






















The unilateral movement matrix 
3J  and joint movement matrix  3NM   for SWN Resources 















0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
=
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0






















1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1























5.3. Preference analysis  
Under the assumption that the conflict is just starting, NBPG, who is the second DM in this 
dispute, does not know the preferences of the DMs. State 
1s  is of interest to it because this state 
can provide many benefits. Hence, NBPG may wish to determine the preferences required to 
make state 
1s  be an equilibrium. In order to ascertain how to negotiate with other DMs to reach 
an equilibrium of interest, the preferences of each DM required for the specified equilibrium are 
important to NBPG. 
State 
1s , which is a state of interest to NBPG, is selected for calculating the preferences of 
each DM required to cause the state to be an equilibrium. An equilibrium may be caused by Nash, 
GMR, SMR or SEQ behavior. The required preferences of each DM making state 
1s  an 
equilibrium under any of the four behaviors are now determined. In the following analyses, 
( , )iP s q

 is used to present the preference relation for DM i  between state s  and q . For 
example, 1 (1, 2) 0P
   means Elsipogtog First Nation less or equally prefers 
2s  to 1s . 
Nash stability: if state 
1s  is Nash stable for each DM, the conditions of the preferences for 
each DM can be obtained by using Equation (2). The required preferences for each DM are listed 
as follows, respectively:  
a) For DM 1: 1 (1, 2) 0P
  . 
b) For DM 2: 2 (1, 3) 0P
   and 2 (1, 5) 0P
  . 
c) For DM 3: 3 (1, 7) 0P
  . 
General metarationality: if state 
1s  is GMR for each DM, the required preferences for each 














a) For DM 1: 1 1 1 1 1 12 (1, 2) (1, 4) (1, 6) (1, 8) (1,10) (1,12) 6P P P P P P
            
b) For DM 2: 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 (1, 3) (1, 4) (1, 9) (1,10) 4 and 2 (1, 5) (1, 6) (1,11) (1,12) 4.P P P P P P P P
                
c) For DM 3: 3 3 3 3 3 32 (1, 7) (1, 8) (1, 9) (1,10) (1,11) (1,12) 6P P P P P P
           . 
Symmetric metarationality: if state 
1s  is SMR for each DM, the required preferences for 
each DM which are given as follows can be obtained by using Inequality (12). 
a) For DM 1: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1(1, 2) 0 or (1, 3) (1, 4) (1, 2) or (1, 5) (1, 6) (1, 2) orP P P P P P P
          
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1(1, 7) (1, 8) (1, 2) or (1, 9) (1,10) (1, 2) or (1,11) (1,12) (1, 2).P P P P P P P P P
               
b) For DM 2: 
2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2
1 2 2 2 1
(1, 3) 0 or (1, 2) (1, 4) (1, 6) (1, 3) or (1, 7) (1, 9) (1,11)
(1, 3) or (1, 8) (1,10) (1,12) (1, 3)
P P P P P P P P
P P P P P
       
    
     
   
 
and  
2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2
1 2 2 2 1
(1, 5) 0 or (1, 2) (1, 4) (1, 6) (1, 5) or (1, 7) (1, 9) (1,11)
(1, 5) or (1, 8) (1,10) (1,12) (1, 5).
P P P P P P P P
P P P P P
       
    
     
   
 
c) For DM 3: 3 3 3 3 3 3 3(1, 7) 0 or (1, 2) (1, 8) (1, 7) or (1, 3) (1, 9) (1, 7) orP P P P P P P
            
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3(1, 4) (1,10) (1, 7) or (1, 5) (1,11) (1, 7) or (1, 6) (1,12) (1, 7).P P P P P P P P P
               
Sequential stability: in order to calculate the required preferences for the specific DM when 
state 
1s  is SEQ for it, the other DMs’ preferences are needed to obtain its joint improvement 
matrix. In practice, partial preferences of each DM are often known. However, the complete 
pairwise comparisons of states to obtain preferences are not known by the DMs or the third party. 
If any of the preferences for each DM are unknown, the model proposed in this research can be 
used to obtain the required preferences causing the state under consideration to be a SEQ 
equilibrium. In this illustration, the known preferences of each DM are given in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 Known preferences for each DM in the Elsipogtog First Nation fracking dispute. 
DMs Known preferences 
Elsipogtog First Nation 3 4 11 12,s s s s  
New Brunswick Provincial Government 7 9 2 8 4 10 12,s s s s s s s  
SWN Resources 5 11 6 12 9 10, ,s s s s s s  
 















a) For DM 1: 2 1 3 1 1(2, 6) [1 (1, 6)] (2, 8) [1 (1, 8)] (1, 2).P P P P P
            
b) For DM 2: 
3 2 2 3 1 2 2
3 1 3 2 2 1 2 2
(3, 9) [1 (1, 9)] (1, 3) and (3, 9) (9,10) [1 (1,10)] (1, 3) and
(3, 9) (9,10) (10, 4) [1 (1, 4)] (1, 3) and (5, 6) [1 (1, 6)] (1, 5).
P P P P P P P
P P P P P P P P
      
       
      
       
 
c) For DM 3: 1 3 2 3 3(7, 8) [1 (1, 8)] (7,11) [1 (1,11)] (1, 7).P P P P P
            
The required preference relationships for each DM in the fracking dispute are obtained using 
the proposed mathematical approach in this research to satisfy the four solution concepts 
consisting of Nash, GMR, SMR and SEQ, respectively. To make the state of interest, 
1s , for both 
NBPG and SWN Resources be an equilibrium (O’Brien & Hipel, 2016), an inequality 
representing the needed preference relationships for each DM is given according to each of the 
four solution concepts. For example, if DM 2 wishes to stay at state 
1s  and maintain it as a GMR 
equilibrium, the logical relationships of preferences for each DM based on the inequality for 
general metarationality can be described as follows: 
a) DM 1 prefers state
1s to at least one of the states 2s , 4s , 6s , 8s , 10s  and 12s . 
b) DM 2 cannot prefer state 
3s  to 1s , 4s  to 1s , 9s  to 1s , and 10s  to 1s  together while it 
cannot prefer 
5s  to 1s , 6s  to 1s , 11s  to 1s , and 12s  to 1s  at the same time. 
c) DM 3 prefers state
1s to at least one of the states 7s , 8s , 9s , 10s , 11s  and 12s . 
 
5.4. Comparison of computational complexity 
In this section, the computational complexity of the novel approach proposed in this paper 
for the inverse GMCR formulation is compared with that of the enumeration method given by 
Kinsara et al. (2015a). The number of the required preference relationships of DM 1 to make state 
1s  be Nash, GMR, SMR or SEQ individually stable in the Elsipogtog First Nation fracking 
dispute is taken as an example for the comparison. In Section 3, three possible preference 
relations for each DM between two states are defined in Definition 1. Hence, the number of 




 where m  is equal to 12 in the Elsipogtog First 
Nation fracking dispute. Each possible preference matrix needs to be tested according to the 
matrix representations of individual stability derived by Xu et al. (2009). However, the number of 
the required preference relationships is reduced by the constraints obtained in Section 5.3. The 















Table 3 Computational complexity of analyzing the preference relationships for DM 1.  
Approach 
Computational Complexity 
Nash GMR SMR SEQ 
This paper 1 63  113  53  
Kinsara et al. (2015a) 123  663  663  1833  
 
Actually, the sign function given in Definition 6 for calculating the individual stabilities is an 
essential component of the matrix representations of GMCR. However, it is really complicated 
for the inverse problem when the elements in the sign function are uncertain. Therefore, two key 
theorems - Theorems 1 and 5 - are put forward to convert the equations having sign functions into 
inequalities without sign functions. The number of needed preference relations is reduced which 
makes the calculations much easier. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, the matrix representations of the inverse problem for a graph model are 
formulated to ascertain the required preferences of each DM for reaching a given equilibrium or 
outcome of interest. Inverse analysis constitutes a powerful extension of the forward and 
behavioral GMCR methodologies for determining all of the possible preferences causing a state 
of interest to be an equilibrium as depicted at the bottom of Fig. 1. Four matrix expressions, 
which are Equation (2), Inequality (4), Inequality (12), and Inequality (23), are given to determine 
all the available preferences satisfying the four solution concepts consisting of Nash, GMR, SMR 
and SEQ, respectively. The calculations for executing the inverse analysis are based upon the 
matrix representation of a conflict and can be readily applied in practice as illustrated by the 
Elsipogtog First Nation fracking dispute case study in the previous section. In fact, the matrix 
formulation of the inverse GMCR viewpoint developed in this paper lays the foundations for 
developing detailed computational implementation algorithms and meaningful expansions of this 
perspective.  
Algebraic expressions for the inverse problem in a graph model are provided in this paper. 
This unique set of explicit algebraic expressions for ascertaining all possible preference 
relationships to make a state of interest become an equilibrium can only handle four basic graph 
model stabilities. It would be worthwhile to extend this inverse GMCR approach to more 
complex stability definitions such as limited-move stability (Zagare, 1984), non-myopic stability 














Additionally, the inverse point view could be expanded for handling conflicts having different 
preference structures such as unknown (Li, Hipel, Kilgour, & Fang, 2004), fuzzy (Basher et al., 
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